This study examines why the 1984 Genocide Convention produces different evidentiary emphases under distinct political conditions by comparing Ukraine v. Russia Federation and South Africa v. Israel before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). While both cases invoke the same legal framework, the Court adopts divergent interpretive approaches. In Ukraine, the ICJ emphasizes procedural restraint, rejecting the use of genocide claims to justify force and requiring a high evidentiary threshold for intent (mens rea). In contrast, in Gaza, the Court applies a plausibility-based standard, allowing intent to be inferred from patterns of conduct (actus reus) in order to prevent irreparable harm.
Through qualitative comparative analysis of ICJ orders, legal scholarship, and international relations theory, this project argues that the ICJ is not inconsistent but adaptive. Its interpretation of the Genocide Convention is shaped by the political and humanitarian context in which claims arise. When genocide allegations are strategically invoked, the Court prioritizes legal precision and constraint; when mass harm is ongoing, it prioritizes preventive intervention. These findings suggest that genocide law operates as both a legal safeguard against misuse and a forward-looking mechanism of humanitarian protection, shaping when and how the international community recognizes its responsibility to act.